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Cambodia: A Country Profile 
Through the efforts of CMAC, Mines Advisory Group and HALO Trust, Cambodia is 
working to eliminate the hundreds of contaminated areas within its borders. 
Rohan Maxwell proposes changes in these operations to sustain removal efforts. 
By Rohan Maxwell, Officer, Canadian Army 
Background 
I n the late I960s, communist insurgems known as the Khmer Rouge began operations against the central government of Cambodia, launching three decades of 
nearly continuous warfare. Vietnamese communists 
supported the insurgents, while the government came to 
be supported by the United States and South Vietnam. 
The fighting was exacerbated by the expansion of the 
Vietnam War into eastern Cambodia, including a massive 
American bombing campaign against communist supply 
lines. Battlefield UXO was widely dispersed, while aerial-
delivered UXO was concentrated in the eastern and central 
provinces (ref 1). According to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (ref 2), about IO 
percent of the mines in Cambodia were laid during this 
period-most in the central and southern provinces. 
The first civil war ended with the defeat of the central 
government in Apriii975. It was followed by 44 horrific 
months of Khmer Rouge rule, during which more than I 
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million Cambodians died of starvation, disease and murder. 
Approximately 5 percent of the mines were laid under the 
Khmer Rouge regime, mainly in the Thai and Vietnamese 
border regions. 
The second civil war began at the end of 1978 when 
Vietnam, goaded by border provocations, drove its erstwhile 
ally back into guerilla warfare and installed a more 
cooperative government led by Khmer Rouge defectors. 
After a decade of fighting between the cenrral government 
(and its Vietnamese backers) and the Khmer Rouge (and 
various non-communist Cambodian groups formerly 
opposed to them), Vietnam withdrew its forces and peace 
negotiations began. With the concurrence of all parties, 
the U.N. Transitional Amhority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
was mandated to run Cambodia for I8 months (1992-
1993) in order to supervise demobilization and conduct 
elections. The Khmer Rouge chose to resume fighting, so 
demobilization failed, bur elections did rake place and the 
central government gained greater international legitimacy. 
The war continued for the remainder of the 1990s, with 
the central government slowly gaining the upper hand and 
internal and external support for the guerillas ebbed. Most 
of the fighting took place in the northern and northwestern 
provinces, bm there was also significant fighting in the 
central and southern provinces. By the late 1990s, the 
guerillas were a spent force and the last groups gave up in 
1999. 
The majority of the mines, 85 percent, were laid 
during rhe second civil war. All combatants used mines 
extensively, and, ironically, the highly mine-affected 
Cambodian civilians began using them for their own 
purposes-self-defense, protection of property, or brutally 
direct dispute resolution. Few records were kept, bur in 
1994 the United Nations estimated that there were as many 
as I 0 million mines in Cambodia (ref2). In I997, this was 
reduced to 4 million to 6 million (ref 2), an estimate 
supported by the number of mines that were actually being 
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located (ref 3). In 1999, the HALO 
Trust rook this empirical approach one 
step further, applying the known 
clearance results to the amount ofland 
thought to still be contaminated: this 
estimate suggested that there had been 
no more than 1 million mines to begin 
with (ref2). 
UNTAC identified more than 
I ,900 potentially contaminated areas 
(ref 3) totaling approximately 3,600 
square kilometers (refs 2 and 3). By 
1999, subsequent survey efforts had 
reduced this to 2,800 sq. km (ref 3) . 
O f this total, 656 sq. km were known 
to be contaminated (ref 4), leaving 
2, 144 sq. km in doubt. Since on 
average only 35 percent of suspected 
terrain is actually mined (ref 2), it is 
probable that a further 750 sq. km of 
contaminated land will be identified, 
for a total of approximately 1,400 sq. 
km. This total will require a significant 
amount of clearance, since on average 
each square kilometer of contaminated 
land contains more than 1,000 mines. 
In 1993, the UNTAC force 
commander estimated that it would 
take 30 to 40 years to demine 
Cambodia (ref 5). In fact, given the 
current clearance rate of approximately 
15 sq. km per year (ref 2), it would 
take 93 years to clear I ,400 sq. km. If 
only high priority land is considered-
land needed for resettlement, 
agriculture and critical development-
the task becomes more manageable. 
For example, the HALO Trust 
estimates that all high-priority land in 
Cambodia could be cleared in five to 
1 0 years at the current rate of progress 
(ref 2). This estimate depends on the 
definition of high-priority land, but 
the key point is that with continued 
international assistance it should be 
possible for most Cambodians to live 
a mine-free existence within a 
reasonable period of time. Once that 
has been accomplished, a smaller-
scale, long-term effort can deal with 
the remaining areas. 
The Mines 
Of all mines in Cambodia, 99 
percent are AP: 68 percent blast, 26 
percent fragmentation, and 5 percent 
bounding fragmentation. The Russian 
PMN-2, whose 115-gram charges 
inflict great damage, accounts for 
approximately 80 percent of the blast 
mines. Smaller blast mines include the 
Vietnamese MD 82B and MN 79, the 
Russian PMD-6 and the very low 
metal content Chinese Type 72A and 
B (the B model incorporates an anti-
disturbance device). Most fragmen-
tation mines are Russian POMZ-2 or 
POMZ-2Ms, while the Chinese Type 
69 is the bounding fragmentation 
mine of choice. AT mines are almost 
all Russian; many of them are buried 
in stacks of two or three more than a 
meter down with a bamboo pole to 
conduct pressure from the surface to 
an AP mine placed atop the first AT 
mine (refS 3 and 4). 
Casualties 
In 1994, Handicap International 
determined from the number of mine-
related amputations per month that 
there were approximately 500 
casualties per month from 1985-1994, 
or a total of 60,000 casualties (ref 5). 
In contrast, a 1998 estimate by the 
U.S. government gives a smaller figure 
of 37,428 casualties for the longer 
period of 1979- 1996, including 
13,328 fatalities (ref 1). The most 
comprehensive and recent information 
is that gathered by the Cambodian 
Mine Incident Database. This source 
provides a figure of 48,842 mine and 
UXO casualties from 1979 to the 
present (ref 8). Adding 15 percent for 
pre-1979 casualties (based on the 
proportion of mines laid before 1979) 
increases this to perhaps 56,168 
casualties since the fighting began, as 
many as 28 percent of which may have 
been fatal (15,727 deaths-refs 1 and 
8). This is by no means a worst-case 
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analysis-at present a majority of the 
estimated 49,846 Cambodian 
amputees (ref 1) are casualties of mines 
and UXO. As amputations represent 
27 to 40 percent of all injuries (refs 5 
and 8), there could have been as many 
as 124,615 ro 183,281 casualties. 
Discrepancies on such a large scale are 
• A mine detecting team ready for the mine field. 
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difficult to fathom until one recalls 
that a much larger figure-the number 
who died under the Khmer Rouge-
has not yet been narrowed down to 
the nearest million. 
The Mine Incident Database 
provides excellent derail on the current 
situation. At present, 91 percent of 
casualties are civil ians, 38 percent of 
whom are injured in the course of 
subsistence activities such as farming, 
gathering wood, fishing, collecting 
food, fetching water and herding 
cattle. An additional 15 percent are 
injured while travelling. Adult males 
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account for 63 percent of all victims, 
bur 30 percent are children under the 
age of 18. Tampering causes 42 
percent of casualties, including one-
quarter of the men, three-quarters of 
the children and one-quarter of the 
women. Most of them fall victim to 
mines, but UXO accounts for 41 
percent of all casualties, including 69 
percent of children . There are, on 
average, 85 new victims each month , 
and 1 in 5 do not survive their injuries. 
Demining Organizations 
There are many humanitarian 
organizations that have conducted, 
supported or are pres en tly 
contributing to demining operations 
in Cambodia (e.g. Norwegian People's 
Aid (NPA), Handicap International 
(HI), World Vision, CARE) but this 
article will discuss only those that are 
currently conducting operations: 
HALO Trust, Mines Advisory G roup 
(MAG) and the Cambodian Mine 
Action Center (CMAC). HALO Trust 
has been working in the northwestern 
provinces of Banteay Meanchey and 
Siem Reap since O crober 1991. Tts 
500 Cambodian staff are organized 
in to 16 clearance teams working 
predominantly in the immedi ate 
vicinity of villages-houses, schools, 
water supplies, health facilities and 
paddy fields. HALO 's Cambodia 
operations are funded by the 
governments of the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Finland, Ireland and 
Japan, as well as the United Nations, 
the European Union (EU) and private 
donors in England and Japan. MAG 
Cambodia starred work in 1992. Its 
min e action ream s are presenrly 
concentrated in the northern and 
northwestern provinces ofPreah Vihar 
and Battambang. Like the HALO 
teams, they normally work in 
proximity to villages. The 389 
Cam bodi an staff (including 48 
amputees and 46 woman deminers) 
and nine expatriates are supported by 
donors including the governments of 
the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Austria, as well as the 
Lutheran World Service and Church 
World Services. 
CMAC evolved from the 
UNTAC Mine C learance Training 
Unit in 1993. After initial funding 
• Billboard depicting a cooperative project of CARE, the World Food Programme and CMAC. C/o Rohan Maxwell 
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difficulties, it expanded ro a strength 
of 2,800 Cambodian staff and 50 
expatriates. C MAC is a Cambodian 
agency, but it relies almost entirely on 
international donations and it is 
administered as a project of the U.N. 
Development Programme. Its annual 
budget has peaked at approximately 
$12 million (U.S.), plus numerous 
donations in kind from donors 
including Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Japan , the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the EU, the 
United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
CMAC's approximate 60 demin-
ing platoons are organized and 
d eployed in groups of four to six 
plaroons plus supporting elements 
(ambulance, radio, guards, etc.), with 
three such groups making up a 
D emining Unit (DU). This type of 
organization mea ns that CMAC 
cannot deal readily with smaller tasks. 
Some flexibility is provided by 
community mine teams whose 
mandate is to take on urgent tasks in 
order to reduce casualties as quickly 
as possible. Ideally, these teams clear 
the most critical areas in a village and 
mark the remaining mined areas un til 
CMAC can mount a larger operation. 
There is also a small development 
demining unit that-has carried our a 
number of high priority tasks with 
funding directly from UNHCR. 
CMAC also deploys EOD, mine 
awareness and mine marking teams. 
Froml993 to 2000, CMAC's 
platoons cleared an average of 10 sq. 
km per year. In mid-2000, three of the 
four DUs were working in the 
no rthwestern provinces of 
Battambang and Banreay Meanchey 
and the fourth was preparing to move 
into northern Cambodia. Unf ort -
unately, CMAC had failed to 
adequately address a multitude of 
concerns about mismanagement and 
corruption, despite increasing donor 
pressure beginning in 1999. As a 
result, funding became steadily scarcer 
an d after scraping by for several 
months, CMAC ceased operations 
and laid off the majority of its staff in 
late 2000. This effectively removed 
three-quarters of the d em ining 
resources in Cambodia. Currenrly, it 
appears that CMAC will resume 
operations at some point in 2001 , 
once donor concerns have been fully 
addressed and funding reinstated. 
Mea nwhile, several co mmercial 
demining companies are currently 
seeking to benefit , in part, from 
C MAC's failings and receive the 
authority to begin demining 
opera nons. 
The Planning Process 
In theory, d emining efforts 
should be preceded by a systematic 
Level 1 Survey. Unfortunately, the 
security situation in Cambodia 
precluded such a survey until the late 
1990s, and as a result the most 
comprehensive data was that collected 
by UNTAC and refined by CMAC. 
Planning was further complicated by 
the fact that many of the most afflicted 
areas were not accessible to demining 
organizations for security reasons. This 
meant that demining efforts were 
frequently directed at areas that were 
accessible, but nor necessarily high 
priority. Now that security levels have 
improved, the plann ing process is 
slowly being refined. In concept, the 
provincial governments should se t 
demining requirements and priorities. 
W here appropriate, NGOs and 
international organizations working in 
the province must also be involved in 
the planning process, as they normally 
provide the resources needed to pur 
the de mined land to best use. Demin-
ing agencies should provide technical 
advice-what can be done, and when 
it can be done-bur they should not 
set priorities. This concept places 
responsibility for land use where it 
belongs. Cambodian political 
st ru c ture at the prov inc ial level 
includes the provincial governor and 
government, the subordinate district 
chiefs, the commune chiefs of each 
district and the village chiefs of each 
commune. The Provincial Rural 
Development com mittee reco m-
mending demining priorities to the 
governor, bur the derailed work is 
carried our by the Land Use Planning 
Unit 
(
LUPU ). Each district has a 
District Working Group (DWG) 
which submits its demining require-
ments and priorities to the LUPU (and 
then to the PRDC) based on input 
from the commune chiefs (who have 
in turn consulted their village chiefs). 
The PRDC then coordinates with the 
demining agencies ro match resources 
to tasks, and the result should be a fully 
coordinated demining and develop-
ment plan. 
This process is sti ll being 
developed . The key is to ensure that 
planners and staff at all levels develop 
the required level of technical 
expertise-for example, the use of 
Geographical Information Systems 
(GIS)-as well as manageme n t, 
organizational and planning skills. In 
Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge 
did its best to eliminate those who 
possessed such skills, planning and 
organizational s tructures are being 
rebuilt very nearly from scratch, and 
it will be some time before the concept 
outlined above can be completely 
implemented. Land riding must also 
become more reliable if de mined land 
is to be pur to its intended use. Finally, 
accurate survey data is still required, 
and to this end a national Level 1 
Survey has finally been initiated, with 
funding from the Canadian govern-
ment. 
National coordination between 
the demining agencies was until 
recently a CMAC responsibility. 
However, the agencies did nor 
normally work in proximity to each 
other, and CMAC and the demining 
NGOs normally concentrated on 
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different types of tasks. There was little 
call for coordination in the field and, 
fo r planning purposes, MAG and 
HALO worked closely with selected 
communities and agencies, while the 
task of working with the provincial 
governments fell largely to CMAC. In 
2000, as part of the response to the 
CMAC crisis, a national demining 
authority was created. The 
Cambodian Mine Action Authority is 
d eveloping policies to regulate rhe 
operation of commercial demining 
companies and to conduct quality 
assurance checks on all demining 
agencies. Its secretary general envisions 
the commercial companies under-
raking mine clearance tasks unsuitable 
for humanitarian organizations. It is 
anticipated that the first such 
operation will be officially licensed in 
March. 
Demining Operations 
Manual demining is the primary 
method in use in Cambodia. The 
equipment is typical for the job 
(tripwire feelers, vegetation cutters, 
mine d etecto rs, prodders and 
excavating tools, varying suites of 
protective equipment), as are the 
phys ically and mentally arduous 
conditions deminers face daily. Rates 
of pay are high by Cambodian 
standards: $ 160 a month for a 
beginner CMAC deminer, in a 
country where the per capita monthly 
income is about $23. These wages and 
• A cluster of three 
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the status associated with being a 
deminer are more than sufficient to 
overcome any concern about death or 
injury, and there is no shortage of 
volunteers. There has been a steady 
trickle of casual ties amon g the 
demining and EOD teams, averaging 
eight or nine a year since 1993, about 
7 percent of which are fatal. The 
variety of soil conditions across the 
country- in particular, che large areas 
in which the soil contains a high 
natural metal content-presents a 
significant challenge, which in 
CMAC's case has been partially 
addressed by deploying two different 
mine detectors. Another challenge is 
the high level of metal contamination 
in many areas- not just o n old 
battlefields, which can be expected to 
contain a great many metal fragments, 
but also on the sites of abandoned 
villages chat are now being resettled. 
Ten miniscule fragments per square 
meter is nor uncommon, and even the 
most experienced dem iner cannot 
differentiate between the signal 
produced by such a fragment and that 
produced by a low me cal con tent 
mme. 
In addition to the manual 
de miners, there are a number of 
mechanical systems that are either in 
service or under evaluation. These 
systems fall into two categories: those 
designed to accelerate the manual 
demining process by removing 
vegetation (and tripwires); and those 
intended to demine on their own, with 
the support of a small number of 
manual deminers. Vegetation cutters 
are well suited co the Cambodian 
situation, where the removal of 
vegetation and checking for tripwires 
consumes up to 70 percent of the 
deminers' time (ref 3). HALO Trust 
has successfu lly deployed seven 
tractor-mounted vegetation cutters in 
support of its 16 clearance teams. 
MAG is currently conducting trials on 
the Pearson Tractor, a multi-functional 
system that can be adapted to clear 
vegetation, cut small trees, and 
conduct area reduction and quality 
assurance tasks. The Tempest is a 
remote-controlled mini-flail, which is 
also being eval uated by MAG for 
vegetation clearance. This machine is 
unusual in that it was built in 
Cambodia by a British charity that 
employs disabled Cambodians. 
Finally, CMAC is testing Japanese 
vegetation cutting systems that are 
essentially tracked excavators with 
brushcutters in place of the excavator 
buckets. 
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The mechanical vegetation cut-
ters described above are either 
operational or show promise; in 
contrast, the two mechanical 
demining systems that have been 
evaluated (both by CMAC) have 
enjoyed less success. The first is the 
Sisu RA-140 flail, originally designed 
to clear scatterable mines from hard 
surfaces or standard mines from open 
terrain. After extensive trials, it" has 
been concluded that this system 
cannot clear terrain to meet required 
standards. Only about 80 percent of 
the mines (at depths of 5 to 20 em) 
are detonated or rendered inoperable, 
and there is a significant risk that some 
mines could be thrown our of the mine 
field into previously safe areas. In 
addition, the system lacks mobility. 
The Finnish government, though, 
remains willing to underwrite the costs 
of d eploying and operating two 
systems, so CMAC uses them as 
vegetation cutters. They enjoy 
reasonable success in this role , 
particularly against thick bamboo, but 
they continue to encounter mobility 
problems. 
T he second system is RHINO, a 
cracked vehicle equipped with two 
heavy counter-rotating drum s 
mounted laterally, one above the other, 
on the front of the chassis. This 
adapted agricultural system is designed 
to till the soil to a depth of 20 em, 
crushing all mines and UXO between 
the drums. At a weight of 48 tons 
(without the 14 ton tiller unit 
attached), it was very difficult to 
deploy RHINO co task sites during 
its trials. Cranes and flatbed trailers of 
the required capacity are not easily 
procured in rural Cambodia, and it 
was sometimes necessary to make 
roure improvements in order to move 
the system. Once on site, the machine 
worked reasonably well when 
difficulties with depth maintenance 
had been resolved. A small number of 
manual deminers dealt with awkward 
spots and provided a measure of 
quality assurance. 
After its initial evaluation, 
RHINO did valuable work in support 
of a multi-village rehabilitation project 
under the aegis of CARE Cambodia. 
The drums survived mine and UXO 
deto nations, but on a number of 
occasions AT mine detonations 
rendered the system inoperable for 
significant periods of time. Spare pans 
were an ongoing concern, because 
most of them had to be shipped from 
Germany. Most critically, RHINO 
was expensive co operate. This can be 
more than made up by the savings in 
manual demining costs, but only if the 
system can be deployed in a series of 
very large, open mine fields in close 
proximity to each other. This was not 
the case in Cambodia, and once the 
funding provided by the German 
government ran out, RHINO 
returned co Germany. 
Finally, CMAC is developing a 
mine detecting dog (MDD) capability, 
funded by the Swedish government. 
The inrent is to use MDDs for area 
reduction and possibly for quality 
assurance , but the training and 
deployment process has been a lengthy 
one. The project began in 1996, but 
there was a significant initial setback 
w hen Cambodian dogs taken to 
Sweden for training proved unsuitable 
for the task, necessitating a fresh start 
using Swedish dogs trained in 
Cambodia. These dogs and their 
Cambodian handlers moved from 
their training facility to Battambang 
province in early 2000. The intent was 
to familiarize the teams with the 
terrain before starting area reduction 
tasks in the spring of 2000, but this 
took longer than anticipated and as of 
mid-2000 there were no operational 
teams. 
Conclusion 
Cambodia remains a heavily mine 
and UXO-contaminated country with 
an extremely high rate of related 
casualties. Humanitarian demining 
wi ll remain a high priority for at least 
another decade, and while the 
demining NGOs can probably be 
relied upon to stay the course and 
successfully nationalize their 
operations, the capability lost by the 
CMAC suspension must be replaced. 
There are various options- retain 
CMAC, create several smaller 
organizations, divert funding to 
NGOs-bm they all require 
continued international support. 
Unfortunately, the recent difficulties 
with CMAC have made many donors 
justifiably wary. The solution is not co 
reduce or withdraw funding, but 
rather to continue to insis t on 
fundamental changes co the way in 
which demining funds are managed 
and demining operations are planned 
and conducted. • 
Rohan Maxwell is an officer in the 
Canadian Army with 13 years 
experience as a combat engineer, 
including mine and UXO clearance 
operations in Iraq and Kuwait. In 
1999, he served as a technical advisor 
with CMAC. 
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